Appellant buyer challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County (California), which ruled in respondent seller's favor on her cross-complaint against the buyer for slander of title to real property and for quieting title thereto, ruled against the buyer on her cross-complaint, and decreed the buyer to be the owner of money held in an escrow account, in a title company's interpleader action to determine ownership of the money.
The seller sought damages for slander of title to her real property, which was the subject of a sales contract between the parties, and for a decree quieting title thereto as a result of the buyer's execution and recordation of a document which rescinded the purchase contract and accused the seller of fraud and misrepresentation. The buyer sought the return of money she had put into escrow and repayment of her deposit. The labor attorney california helps you in all labor matters.
On appeal, the buyer argued that the evidence did not support the judgment in the seller's favor on the slander of title action and that the seller was not entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in clearing her slandered title. The appellate court held that (1) the evidence supported the verdict where the buyer had no legal basis for rescinding the contract because there was no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the seller, and there was evidence that the buyer disparaged the seller's title by recording a document containing false accusations with knowledge that the document would cloud the seller's title, which constituted implied malice; and (2) the seller was entitled to attorney fees for quieting title to her land as special damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, which held in favor of the seller on her slander of title claim against the buyer and decreed the buyer to be the owner of money in escrow.
Appellant county sought review of an order of the Superior Court of Plumas County (California), which sustained the general demurrer of respondents, herders who were in the business of raising, grazing, herding, and pasturing sheep and lambs within the county. The county had filed an action to recover from the herders license fees due for the operation of their business.
The herders were engaged in the business of raising, grazing, herding, and pasturing sheep and lambs in the county. A county ordinance required the herders to pay a license fee for the operation of their business. The herders, however, refused to pay the license. The county therefore filed a complaint, seeking to recover the unpaid license fees. The herders filed a general demurrer. The trial court entered an order sustaining the demurrer. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that it could not be said as a matter of law that the charge of 10 cents per head of sheep and lambs was so grossly disproportionate to the expense incurred by the county by reason of the herders' business that the ordinance was void upon its face. The county's expense for enforcing the ordinance could not be determined from the ordinance but was instead a question of fact to be determined at trial.
The court reversed the trial court's order, which sustained the general demurrer filed by the herders in the county's action to recover unpaid license fees from the herders for the operation of their business.